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Abstract:  
Assessments of social welfare do not usually take into account population sizes. This 
can lead to serious social evaluation flaws, particularly in contexts in which policies can 
affect demographic growth. We develop in this paper a little-known though ethically 
attractive approach to correcting the flaws of traditional welfare analysis, an approach 
that is population-size sensitive and that is based on critical-level generalized 
utilitarianism (CLGU). Traditional CLGU is extended by considering arbitrary orders of 
welfare dominance and ranges of “poverty lines” and values for the “critical level” of how 
much a life must be minimally worth to contribute to social welfare. Simulation 
experiments briefly explore the normative relationship between population sizes and 
critical levels. We apply the methods to household level data to rank Canada’s social 
welfare across 1976, 1986, 1996 and 2006 and to estimate normatively and statistically 
robust lower and upper bounds of critical levels over which these rankings can be made. 
The results show dominance of recent years over earlier ones, except when comparing 
1986 and 1996. In general, therefore, we conclude that Canada’s social welfare has 
increased over the last 35 years in spite (or because) of a substantial increase in 
population size. 
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1 Introduction
Is the “value” of a society increasing with its population size? How can that question be
dealt with in a normatively robust framework? What sort of statistical procedures can assess
this empirically? What does the evidence actually suggest? To address these questions is the
main objective of this paper.
Poverty and welfare comparisons are routinely made under the implicit assumptions that
population sizes do not matter, or equivalently that population sizes are the same. Techni-
cally, this is implicitly or explicitly done by calling on the so-called population replication
invariance axiom. The population replication invariance axiom says that an income distribu-
tion and its k-fold replication, with k being any positive integer, should be deemed equivalent
from a social welfare perspective. Welfare and inequality comparisons can then be performed
in per capita terms.
However, as Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005) and others have argued, popula-
tion size should probably matter when assessing social welfare. We may not be indifferent,
for instance, to whether some income (or GDP) statistics are expressed in per capita or in
total terms. When total income changes in a society, we may wish to know whether this is
due to changes in population size or changes in per capita income; when per capita income
changes, we may also wish to know whether this is associated with a change in population
size. Generally speaking, our assessment of the welfare value of a change in the distribution
of incomes may depend on how population size also changes.
In addressing these issues — which we believe to be important ones — our work adopts
as a conceptual framework for social welfare comparisons the “critical-level generalized util-
itarianism” (CLGU) principle of Blackorby and Donaldson (1984). CLGU essentially says
that adding a person to an existing population will increase social welfare if and only if that
person’s income exceeds the value of a critical level. From a normative perspective, the crit-
ical level can be interpreted as the minimum income needed for someone to add “value” to
humanity. (The critical level has been termed the value of living by Broome (1992b).) So-
cial welfare according to CLGU is then defined as the sum of the differences between some
transformation of individual incomes and the same transformation of the critical level.
CLGU is a social evaluation approach that is both normatively attractive and (surpris-
ingly) little known; it has also not yet (to our knowledge) been tested and applied. There
are, however, two major difficulties in implementing CLGU. First, it is difficult in practice to
agree on a non-arbitrary value for the critical level. In a world of heterogenous preferences
and opinions, it is indeed difficult to envisage a relatively wide consensus on something as
fundamentally un-consensual as the “value of living”. Second, it is also difficult to agree on
which transformation to apply to individual incomes when computing social welfare. We get
around these difficulties in this paper by applying stochastic dominance methods for making
population comparisons under a CLGU framework. This avoids having to specify a particular
form for the transformation of individual incomes. This also enables assessing the ranges of
critical levels over which normatively robust CLGU comparisons can be made. In a poverty
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comparison context, it also makes it possible to derive the ranges of poverty lines over which
robust CLGU comparisons can be obtained.
Although the paper’s main objective in this paper is to compare welfare through CLGU,
the use of CLGU for social evaluation purposes has important implications for the design of
policy and for the analysis and monitoring of human development in general. According to
CLGU , the socially optimal population size maximizes the product of population size and
the difference between a single-individual “socially representative income” and the critical
level. This results in policy prescriptions that optimize the trade-off between population size
and some measure of per capita well-being in excess of the critical level.
For instance, the process of demographic transition (through a reduction of both fertility
and mortality) in which a large part of humanity has recently engaged is often rationalized as
one that maximizes per capita welfare under resource constraints. It is unlikely for developed
countries that this process also maximizes social welfare in a CLGU perspective. As we will
also see in our illustration, Canada’s CLGU has robustly increased in the last 35 years despite
a significant increase in population size. For developed countries, such a social evaluation
perspective can thus provide a rationale for promoting policies that encourage fertility, such
as the provision of relatively generous child benefits for families with many children.
Whether the current demographic transition is consistent with CLGU maximization in
developing countries depends much on the value that is set for the critical level. A social
planner would favor a population increase only if the additional persons enjoyed a level of
income at least equal to that level. This would be more difficult to achieve in less developed
countries, where average income is lower relative to the critical level, so a smaller population
might then be desirable. Optimal policies would then aim to increase per capita income and
raise social welfare by limiting demographic growth (particularly of the poor people). This
could involve compulsory measures of birth control for the poor and measures for increasing
the life years (only) of the more affluent.
The use of CLGU thus enables social evaluations to be made when the distributions and
policy outcomes to be compared involve varying population sizes. These are certainly the
most generally encountered cases in theory and in practice. This is also almost always the
appropriate setting when making welfare comparisons across time.
A few papers have recently considered comparisons of populations of unequal sizes with-
out using the replication-invariance axiom. One of the most recent is Aboudi, Thon, and
Wallace (2010), who generalize the well-known concept of majorization and suggest that an
income distribution should be deemed more equal than another one if the first distribution can
be constructed from the second distribution through linear transformations of incomes. Pogge
(2007) proposes the use of the Pareto criterion to compare social welfare in income distribu-
tions with different numbers of individuals. Considering only the most well-off persons in
the larger population (such that their number be equal to the size of the smaller population),
Pogge (2007) suggests that social welfare in the larger population should be greater than
in the smaller population if every person in the larger population reduced to the size of the
smaller one enjoys a level of well-being greater than that of every person in the smaller popu-
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lation. Other relatively recent interesting contributions include Broome (1992b), Mukherjee
(2008) and Gravel, Marchant, and Sen (2008). Our paper differs from these earlier papers
by focussing on how to rank distributions and outcomes normatively and empirically using
CLGU-based dominance criteria.
The paper’s normative setting is described in Section 2, where CLGU is introduced and
motivated and social welfare dominance relations are defined. Section 2 also discusses
how this relates to well-known poverty dominance criteria. This dominance context extends
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984)’s focus on CLGU indices. It also builds on the theoretical
contribution of Trannoy and Weymark (2009), who proposes a CLGU dominance criterion
that is an extension of generalized Lorenz dominance and second-order welfare dominance.
Section 3 presents the statistical framework that is used for analyzing dominance rela-
tions, both in terms of estimation and inference. It also develops the apparatus necessary
to estimate normatively robust ranges of critical levels. Section 4 provides the results of a
few simulation experiments that show how and why population size may be of concern —
normatively and statistically — for social welfare rankings.
Section 5 applies the methods to comparable Canadian Surveys of Consumer Finances
(SCF) for 1976 and 1986 and Canadian Surveys of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID)
for 1996 and 2006. Canada’s population size has increased by almost 50% between 1976
and 2006. We assess whether social welfare has increased or decreased over that period
in Canada, allowing for variations in population size and income distributions and using
ranges of “poverty lines” (or censoring points) and values of critical levels. Using asymptotic
and bootstrap tests, we find that Canada’s welfare has globally improved in the last 35 years
despite the substantial increase in population size and the fact that new lives do not necessarily
increase society’s value in a CLGU framework. More surprisingly perhaps, Canada’s smaller
population in 1986 is nevertheless socially better than Canada’s larger population in 1996
for a relatively wide range of critical levels and despite a significant increase in average and
total income. Hence, not only can average and total utilitarianism present significant ethical
weaknesses, but their social evaluation rankings can differ importantly from those derived
from critical-level utilitarianism. Section 6 concludes.
2 CLGU: an alternative approach to assessing social wel-
fare
2.1 Average and total utilitarianism
The most popular methods to assess social welfare in the context of variable population
sizes are based on average utilitarianism. Using average utilitarianism as a social evaluation
criterion implicitly assumes that population sizes should not matter. One consequence of this
is that a population with only one individual will dominate any other population of arbitrar-
ily larger size as long as those larger populations’ average utility is (perhaps only slightly)
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smaller than the single person’s utility level — see for instance Cowen (1989), Broome
(1992a), Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson 2005, and Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007). This
social evaluation framework would seem to be too biased against population size: it would
say for instance that a society made of a single very rich person (Bill Gates for example)
would be preferable to any other society of greater size but lower average utility.
An alternatively popular social evaluation criterion is total utilitarianism. Adopting to-
tal utilitarianism leads, however, to Parfit (1984)’s “repugnant conclusion”. Parfit (1984)’s
“repugnant conclusion” bemoans the implication that, with total utilitarianism, a sufficiently
large population will necessarily be considered better than any other smaller population, even
if the larger population has a very low average utility:
For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high
quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose
existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members
have lives that are barely worth living. (Parfit 1984, p.388).
Such a social evaluation framework again seems to be too strongly biased, this time against
average utility.
2.2 Critical-level generalized utilitarianism
Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) have proposed CLGU as an alternative to (and in order
to address the flaws of) average and total utilitarianism. To see how CLGU is defined, con-
sider two populations of different sizes. The smaller population of size M has a distribution
of incomes (or some other indicator of individual welfare) given by the vector u, and the
larger population of size N has a distribution of incomes given by the vector v, with M < N .
Let u := (u1, u2,..., uM), where ui being the income of individual i, and v := (v1, v2,..., vN)
with vj being the income of individual j. Let the level of social welfare in u and v be given
by
W (u;α) =
M∑
i=1
(g(ui)− g(α)) (1)
and
W (v;α) =
N∑
j=1
(g(vj)− g(α)) , (2)
where g is some increasing transformation of incomes and α is a “critical level”. Note that
social welfare in the two populations remains unchanged when a new individual with income
equal to α is added to the population. The smaller population exhibits greater social welfare
than the larger one given this if and only if W (u;α) ≥W (v;α).
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CLGU thus aggregates the differences between transformations of individual incomes
and of a critical level. It can therefore avoid some of average utilitarianism’s problems, since
the addition of a new person will be socially profitable if that person’s income is higher than
the critical level, although that income may not necessarily be higher than average income.
CLGU can also avoid the “repugnant conclusion” since it is socially undesirable to add indi-
viduals with incomes lower than the critical level, regardless of how many there may be of
them. Overall, CLGU provides a relatively appealing and transparent basis on which to make
social evaluations and avoid the flaws associated to average and total utilitarianism.
Suppose now that we may wish to focus on those income values below some censoring
point z. This is a typical procedure in poverty analysis. Suppose that z+ is the maximum
possible level for such a censoring point (or maximum “poverty line” in a poverty context).
Also denote uα := (u, α, ..., α) as u “expanded to size of population v” by adding N −M
α elements. For a poverty line z, the well-known FGT (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984)
poverty indices with parameter s− 1 (order s in what follows) for distribution v are defined
as
P s
v
(z) =
1
N
N∑
i=j
(z − vj)s−1I (vj ≤ z) , (3)
where I (·) is an indicator function with value set to 1 if the condition is true and to 0 if not.
Similarly, the FGT indices for the expanded population uα are defined as
P s
uα
(z) =
M
N
M∑
i=1
(z − ui)s−1I (ui ≤ z)
+
(
1− M
N
)
(z − α)s−1I (α ≤ z) . (4)
These expressions will be useful to test for CLGU dominance.
2.3 CLGU dominance
The welfare functions in (1) and (2) depend on g and α. One could choose a specific
functional form for g and a specific value for α, but that would be inconvenient in the sense
that the welfare rankings of u and v could then be criticized as depending on those choices.
It is thus useful to consider making welfare rankings that are valid over classes of functions
g and ranges of critical levels α. To do this, let s =1,2,..., stand for an order of “welfare
dominance”. Consider Cs as the set of functions R −→ R that are s times continuously
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differentiable. Define the class F sz−,z+ of functions as
F sz−,z+ :=
gz ∈ Cs
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
z ≤ z+,
gz(x) = gz(z) for all x > z,
gz(x) = gz(z−) for all x < z−,
and where − (1)k dkgz(x)
dxk
≤ 0 ∀k = 1, ..., s.
 (5)
Also denote W sα,z−,z+ as the set of CLGU social welfare functions with gz ∈ F sz−,z+ and
critical level α. For any vector of income v ∈ RN+ , N ≥ 1, this set is defined as:
W sα,z−,z+ :=
{
W
∣∣∣∣∣W (v;α) =
N∑
i=1
(gz(vi)− gz(α)) where gz ∈ F sz−,z+ and v ∈ RN
}
.
(6)
The first and third lines in (5) say that the censoring point z must be below some upper level
z+. The second line says that for social evaluation purposes we can set to z− those incomes
that are lower than z− — this assumption is mostly made for statistical tractability reasons,
to which we come back later. The fourth line on the derivatives of gz imposes that the social
welfare functions be Paretian (for k = 1), be concave and thus increasing with a transfer from
a richer to a poorer person (for k = 2), be transfer-sensitive in the sense of Shorrocks (1987)
(for k = 3), etc.. The greater the order s, the more sensitive is social welfare to the income
levels of the poorest.
We can then define the (partial) CLGU dominance ordering %sWα,z−,z+ as
u %sWα,z−,z+ v ⇔W (u;α) ≥W (v;α)∀W ∈ W sα,z−,z+. (7)
The welfare ordering (7) considers u to be better than v if and only if W (u;α) is greater
than W (v;α) for all of the functions W that belong to W sα,z−,z+.
Similarly, define the (partial) FGT dominance ordering %sPz−,z+ as
uα %
sP
z−,z+ v⇔ P suα(z)− P sv(z) ≤ 0 for all z− ≤ z ≤ z+. (8)
This FGT ordering (8) considers u to be better than v if and only if the FGT curve P s
uα
(z)
for uα is always below the FGT curve P sv(z) for v for all values of z− ≤ z ≤ z+.
Duclos and Zabsonré (2009) demonstrate that the two partial orderings are equivalent, for
some α, z− and z+:
u %sWα,z−,z+ v⇔ uα %sPz−,z+ v. (9)
This result is used as a foundation for the statistical and the empirical analysis of the rest of
the paper. The current paper uses in fact a natural extension of (9) by focussing on dominance
over a range of critical levels α ∈ [α−, α+]:
u %sWα,z−,z+ v, ∀α ∈ [α−, α+]⇔ uα %sPz−,z+ v, ∀α ∈ [α−, α+]. (10)
7
This provides us with a social ordering that is robust over a class s of functions g and over
ranges [z−, z+] and [α−, α+] of censoring points and critical levels.
3 Statistical inference
This section develops methods to infer statistically the above dominance relations. For
the purpose of statistical inference, we assume that the population data have been generated
by a data generating process (DGP) from which a finite (but usually large) population is
generated. For some (but not for all of the results), we will need to assume that this DGP is
continuous, but this is different from saying that the populations must be continuous (or of
infinite size) too. For purposes of inference on the populations, we will use data provided by
a finite (typically relatively small) sample of observations drawn from the populations. We
define F and G as the distribution functions of the DGP that generate the population vectors
u and v respectively.
3.1 Testing dominance
The equivalence between FGT dominance and CLGU dominance conveniently allows
focusing on FGT dominance. As above, let α denote the critical level and α+ be the maximum
possible value that we assume this critical level can take. For any poverty line z, define the
FGT index of order s (s ≥ 1) for the expanded population uα as
P sFα(z) =
z∫
0
(z − u)s−1dFα(u), (11)
where Fα(z) := MN F (z) +
N−M
N
I(α ≤ z) is the distribution of the expanded population uα
and F (z) is the distribution function of u. The FGT index of the population v is similarly
defined as
P sG(z) =
z∫
0
(z − v)s−1dG(v). (12)
The task now is to introduce procedures to test for whether a population CLGU-dominates
another one at order s, and this, over intervals of censoring points and critical levels. Two
general approaches can be followed for that purpose. The first is based on the following
formulation of hypotheses:
Hs0 : P
s
G(z)− P sFα(z) ≤ 0 for all (z, α) ∈
[
z−, z+
]⊗ [α−, α+] , (13)
Hs1 : P
s
G(z)− P sFα(z) > 0 for some (z, α) ∈
[
z−, z+
]⊗ [α−, α+] . (14)
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This formulation leads to what are generally called “union-intersection” tests. It amounts
to define a null of dominance and an alternative of non-dominance. (The null above is that
v dominates u, but that can be reversed.) It has been used and applied in several papers
where a Wald statistic or a test statistic based on the supremum of the difference between the
FGT indices is generally used to test for dominance — see for example Bishop, Formby, and
Thistle (1992) and Barrett and Donald (2003) and Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2006).
Davidson and Duclos (2006) discuss why this formulation leads to decisive outcomes only
when it rejects the null of dominance and accepts non-dominance. This, however, fails to
order the two populations. In those cases in which it is desirable to order the populations, it
may be useful to use a second approach and reverse the roles of (13) and (14) by positing the
hypotheses as
Hs0 : P
s
G(z)− P sFα(z) ≥ 0 for some (z, α) ∈
[
z−, z+
]⊗ [α−, α+] , (15)
Hs1 : P
s
G(z)− P sFα(z) < 0 for all (z, α) ∈
[
z−, z+
]⊗ [α−, α+] . (16)
This formulation leads to “intersection-union” tests, in which the null is the hypothesis of
non-dominance and the alternative is the hypothesis of dominance. This test has been em-
ployed by Howes (1993) and Kaur, Prakasa Rao, and Singh (1994). Both papers use a mini-
mum value of the t-statistic. An alternative test is based on empirical likelihood ratio (ELR)
statistics, first proposed by Owen (1988) — see also Owen (2001) for a comprehensive ac-
count of the EL technique and its properties. Here, we follow the procedure of Davidson
and Duclos (2006), which can also be found in Batana (2008), Chen and Duclos (2008) and
Davidson (2009). Unlike these papers, we must, however, pay special attention to the value
of the critical level and to the sizes of the two populations.
Let m and n be the sizes of the samples drawn from the populations u and v respectively
and let w˜ui and w˜vj be the sampling weights associated to the observation of individual i in the
sample of u and individual j in the sample of v respectively. Suppose also that (ui, w˜ui ) and(
vj , w˜
v
j
)
are independently and identically distributed (iid) across i and j. For the purposes
of asymptotic analysis, define wui and wvj such that
wui = mw˜
u
i and wvj = nw˜vj . (17)
These quantities can be used and interpreted as estimates of the population sizes of u and v
respectively. They remain of the same order as m and n tend to infinity. We can then compute
Pˆ sFα(z) and Pˆ sG(z), which are respectively the sample equivalents of P sFα(z) and P sG(z). They
are given by
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Pˆ sFα(z) =
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui (z − ui)s−1+
)/(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)
+
[
1−
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui
)/(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)]
(z − α)s−1+ (18)
and
Pˆ sG(z) =
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj (z − vj)s−1+
)/(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)
, (19)
where (z − x)s−1+ ≡ (z − x)s−1 I (x ≤ z) for any income value x.
We use the above to compute an ELR statistic. Let pui and pvj be the empirical probabilities
associated to observations i and j respectively. The ELR statistic is similar to an ordinary
LR statistic, and is defined as twice the difference between the unconstrained maximum of
an empirical loglikelihood function (ELF) and a constrained ELF maximum. Subject to the
null (15) that u dominates v at some given value of z and α, the constrained ELF maximum
ELF (z, α) is given by
ELF (z, α) = max
pui ,p
v
j
[
m∑
i=1
log pui +
n∑
j=1
log pvj
]
(20)
subject to
m∑
i=1
pui = 1,
n∑
j=1
pvj = 1 (21)
and
m∑
i=1
pui w
u
i (z − ui)s−1+ +
(
n∑
j=1
pvjw
v
j −
m∑
i=1
pui w
u
i
)
(z − α)s−1+ ≤
n∑
j=1
pvjw
v
j (z − vj)s−1+ .
(22)
The unconstrained maximum ELF is defined as (20) subject to (21). Notice that (22) can also
be rewritten as
m∑
i=1
pui w
u
i
[
(z − ui)s−1+ − (z − α)s−1+
] ≤ n∑
j=1
pvjw
v
j
[
(z − vj)s−1+ − (z − α)s−1+
]
. (23)
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In the spirit of Davidson and Duclos (2006), we compute the ELR statistic for all possible
pairs of (z, α) ∈ [z−, z+] ⊗ [α−, α+], so that we can inspect the value of that statistic when
the null hypothesis in (15) is verified at each of these pairs separately. The final ELR test
statistic is then given by
LR = min
(z,α)∈[z−,z+]⊗[α−,α+]
LR (z, α) , (24)
where
LR (z, α) = 2 [ELF − ELF (z, α)] . (25)
When, in the samples, there is non-dominance of u on v at some value of z and α in
[z−, z+]⊗[α−, α+], the constraint (23) does not matter and the constrained and unconstrained
ELF values are the same. The resulting (unconstrained) empirical probabilities are given by
pui =
1
m
and pvj =
1
n
. (26)
In the case where there is dominance in the samples, the constraint (23) binds and the proba-
bilities obtained from the resolution of the problem are:
pui =
1
m− ρ [ν − wui ((z − ui)s−1+ − (z − α)s−1+ )] (27)
and
pvj =
1
n+ ρ
[
ν − wvj
(
(z − vj)s−1+ − (z − α)s−1+
)] . (28)
The constants ρ and ν are the solutions to the following equations,

m∑
i=1
pui w
u
i
[
(z − ui)s−1+ − (z − α)s−1+
]
=
n∑
j=1
pvjw
v
j
[
(z − vj)s−1+ − (z − α)s−1+
]
n∑
j=1
pvjw
v
j
[
(z − vj)s−1+ − (z − α)s−1+
]
= ν,
(29)
with pui and pvj given in (27) and (28). The solutions cannot be found analytically, so a
numerical method must be used.
An alternative, though analogous, statistic is the t-statistic of Kaur, Prakasa Rao, and
Singh (1994), which is the minimum of t (z, α) over [z−, z+]⊗ [α−, α+], where
t (z, α) =
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)[
v̂ar
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
)]1/2 , (30)
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and v̂ar
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
)
is the estimate of the asymptotic variance of Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z) for
some pair (z, α). Denote that minimized t-statistic by t.
Testing the null of dominance makes sense only when there is dominance in the original
samples.We can then proceed with asymptotic tests and/or bootstrap tests with either LR or
t statistics, although for bootstrap tests we must first obtain the empirical probabilities of the
ELF approach. Let LRa and ta denote the statistics in the case of asymptotic tests and let LRb
and tb be the statistics for the bootstrap tests. For asymptotic tests and for a test of level β, the
decision rule is to reject the null of non-dominance in favor of the alternative of dominance if
ta exceeds the critical value associated to β of the standard normal distribution. Note that LR
and the square of t are asymptotically equivalent — see Section 8.3 in the Appendix for more
details. We can therefore also use a decision rule of rejecting the null of non-dominance in
favor of the alternative of dominance if LRa exceeds the critical value associated to β of the
chi-square distribution.
The bootstrap testing procedure is formally set up as follows:
Step 1: For two initial samples drawn from two populations, compute LR (z, α) and t (z, α)
for every pair (z, α) in [z−, z+] ⊗ [α−, α+] as described above. If there exists at least
one (z, α) for which Pˆ sG(z) − Pˆ sFα(z) ≥ 0, then Hs0 cannot be rejected; choose then a
value equal to 1 for the p-value and stop the process. If not, continue to the next step.
Step 2: Search for the minima statistics, that is to say, find LR as the minimum of LR (z, α)
and t as the minimum of t (z, α) over all pairs (z, α). Suppose that LR is obtained
at (z˜, α˜) and denote p˜ui and p˜vj the resulting probabilities given by (27) and (28) and
evaluated at (z˜, α˜).
Step 3: Use p˜ui and p˜vj to generate bootstrap samples of size m for u and of size n for v by
resampling the original data with these probabilities. The bootstrap samples are thus
drawn with unequal probabilities p˜ui and p˜vj . It can result that, in some of the bootstrap
samples, the estimated size of population u becomes larger than that of population v.
In such cases, the roles of Fα and G are subsequently reversed, that is, we consider F
and Gα.1
Step 4: As is usual, consider 399 bootstrap replications, b = 1,...,399. For each replication, use
the bootstrap data and follow previous step 3. Compute the two statistics LRb and tb
for every b ≤ 399 as in the original data.
Step 5: Compute the p-value of the bootstrap statistics as the proportion of LRb that are greater
than LR — the ELR statistic obtained with the original data — or as the proportion of
tb that are greater than t — the t-statistic obtained with the original data.
Step 6: Reject the null of non-dominance if the bootstrap p-value is lower than some specified
nominal levels.
1This will not occur in samples where all observations have the same weights.
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3.2 Estimating robust ranges of critical levels
To get around the problem of the absence of empirical/ethical consensus on an appropriate
range of values for the critical level, we can search for evidence on the ranges of critical levels
that can order distributions (see Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson 1996 and Trannoy and
Weymark 2009 for a discussion). For this, consider again two populations u and v of sizes
M and N respectively. Suppose that we have two samples drawn from u and v and assume
for simplicity that they are independent and that their moments of order 2 (s− 1) are finite.
Denote m and n the sizes of the two samples. For some fixed z− and z+, define αs and αs
respectively as follows:
αs = max{α|P sFα(z) ≥ P sG(z) for all z− ≤ z ≤ z+} (31)
and
αs = min{α|P sFα(z) ≤ P sG(z) for all z− ≤ z ≤ z+}. (32)
In the light of how they are defined, we can refer to αs as an “upper bound” of the critical
level and αs as a “lower bound” of the critical level. In order to have FGT dominance made
robustly over ranges of censoring points, we can also define critical values for the maximum
censoring point as:
z+s = max{z+|P sFα(z) ≥ P sG(z) for all z− ≤ z ≤ z+} (33)
and
zs+ = max{z+|P sFα(z) ≤ P sG(z) for all z− ≤ z ≤ z+}, (34)
where α is some fixed value of critical level. z+s is the maximum censoring point for which
v dominates u and zs+ is the maximum censoring point for which u dominates v.
Given the definitions (31) and (32) and assuming that αs and αs exist, it is useful to define
the following assumptions. For αs, suppose that{
M
N
P sF (z) ≥ P sG(z) for all z ≤ αs
M
N
P sF (z) < P
s
G(z) for some z ≥ αs + ǫ and z− ≤ z ≤ z+,
(VDUs)
where ǫ is some arbitrarily small positive value. For αs, consider first the case of s =1 and
suppose that{
M
N
P 1F (z) +
(N−M)
N
I(α1 ≤ z) ≤ P 1G(z) for all z− ≤ z ≤ z+
M
N
P 1F (z) +
(N−M)
N
> P 1G(z) for some z ≤ α1 − ǫ,
(UDV1)
where ǫ is again some arbitrarily small positive value. When s ≥ 2, we modify the above
assumptions slightly and define αs as:
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{
M
N
P sF (z) +
(N−M)
N
(z − αs)s−1+ ≤ P sG(z) for all z− ≤ z ≤ z+
M
N
P sF (z
s) + N−M
N
(zs − αs)s−1+ = P sG(zs) for αs < zs ≤ z+
(UDVs)
with (z − x)s−1+ = max [(z − x)s−1, 0]. Suppose that zs exists and is the crossing point
between the FGT curves P sFα and P
s
G. In most cases, we would expect zs to coincide with
z+ — see Section 8.1 in the Appendix for more details. Assumptions VDUs and UDVs
are useful for the estimation of αs and αs. In order to better understand their role, consider
the case of s = 1. Figures 1 and 2 graph cumulative distributions functions adjusted for
differences in population sizes.2 It is supposed that the larger population v dominates the
smaller population u for a range [0, z+] of censoring points α ∈ [0, α1] . This is expressed
by the fact that the cumulative distributionG of v is under the cumulative distribution F of u
adjusted by the ratio M
N
up to α1 > 0. Figure 1 shows the case where the critical level is equal
to 0. In this case, the larger population clearly dominates the smaller one. At the critical level
value α1, the two functions cross; v just dominates u when the critical level is equal to α1.
However, v does not dominate u when the critical level takes a value α0 > α1.
In Figure 3, u is assumed to dominate v. The dominance of u over v is preserved when
the critical level has a value at least equal to α1. But this is not true for any critical level α0
lower than α1.3
Note that α1 and α1 are the crossing points of FGT curves. This suggests the application
of the procedure of Davidson and Duclos (2000) for estimation and inference of the popula-
tion values of α1 and α1. Consider the populations u and v with sample sizes equal to m and
n respectively. Using assumption UDV1 (also see Figure 3) and assuming continuity of the
DGP at α1, we have that
M
N
P 1F (α
1) +
(N −M)
N
− P 1G(α1) = 0. (35)
Denoting ψ (z) = M
N
P 1F (z) +
(N−M)
N
I(α1 ≤ z)−P 1G(z), then ψ (z) ≤ 0 for all z− ≤ z ≤ z+
and ψ (α1) = 0. Recall that
Pˆ 1F (z) =
1
m
∑m
i=1w
u
i I(ui ≤ z)
1
m
∑m
i=1w
u
i
, Pˆ 1G(z) =
1
n
∑n
j=1w
v
j I(vj ≤ z)
1
n
∑n
j=1w
v
j
, (36)
where wui and wvj are given in the previous section. A natural estimator of α1 would be α̂1
such that
Mˆ
Nˆ
Pˆ 1F (αˆ
1) +
(
Nˆ − Mˆ
)
Nˆ
− Pˆ 1G(αˆ1) = 0, (37)
2See Section 8.1 in the Appendix for the case of s > 1.
3The Appendix illustrates graphically two cases of dominance of u over v when s > 1.
14
where Mˆ = 1
m
∑m
i=1w
u
i and Nˆ = 1n
∑n
j=1w
v
j are respectively the estimators of the popula-
tion sizes of u and v.
For s ≥ 2, denote φ (αs) = M
N
P sF (z
s) + N−M
N
(zs − αs)s−1+ − P sG(zs). Recall that zs
is defined on page 13 and zs > αs. Then φ′ (αs) = − (s− 1) N−M
N
(zs − αs)s−2 6= 0. A
consistent estimator of αs, αˆs, can be obtained from
Mˆ
Nˆ
Pˆ sF (z
s) +
Nˆ − Mˆ
Nˆ
(zs − αˆs)s−1 − Pˆ sG(zs) = 0, (38)
where
Pˆ sF (z
s) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui (z
s − ui)s−1+
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui
and Pˆ sG(zs) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj (z
s − vj)s−1+
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
. (39)
For s ≥ 2 , αˆs is given analytically by
αˆs = zs −
[
Nˆ Pˆ sG(z
s)− MˆPˆ sF (zs)
Nˆ − Mˆ
] 1
s−1
. (40)
To derive the asymptotic distribution of αˆs for s ≥ 1, assume that F and G are differ-
entiable and denote P 0F (z) = F ′ (z) and P 0G (z) = G′ (z). Also suppose that (wui )
m
i=1 ∼
iid
(
µwu, σ
2
wu
)
and
(
wvj
)n
j=1
∼ iid (µwv , σ2
wv
)
. Assuming that r = m
n
remains constant as m
and n tend to infinity, let
Λ1 =

1
Γ42
var
[
wv (α1 − v)0+
]
+
r−1
Γ42
[
varwu (α1 − u)0+ + σ2wu
]
+[
Γ3(α1)
Γ42
− Γ1(α1)
Γ42
+ Γ2
Γ42
]2
σ2wv−
2r−1
Γ42
[
E
(
(wu)2 (α1 − u)0+
)
− Γ1(α1)Γ2
]
+
2
[
Γ1(α1)
Γ43
− Γ2
Γ3
4
− Γ3(α1)
Γ43
]
×[
E
(
(wv)2 (α1 − v)0+
)
− Γ3(α1)Γ4
]

(41)
where Γ1(α1) = E
[
m−1
m∑
i=1
wui (α
1 − ui)0+
]
, Γ2 = µwu , Γ3(α
1) = E
[
n−1
n∑
j=1
wvj (α
1 − vj)0+
]
and Γ4 = µwv and, for s ≥ 2,
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Λs =

1
Γ42
var
[
wv (zs − v)s−1+
]
+
r−1
Γ42
[
varwu (zs − u)s−1+ + (zs − αs)2s−2 σ2wu
]
+[
Γ3
Γ42
− Γ1
Γ42
+ Γ2
Γ42
(zs − αs)s−1
]2
σ2wv−
2r−1
Γ42
(zs − αs)s−1 [E ((wu)2 (zs − u)s−1+ )− Γ1Γ2]+
2
[
Γ1
Γ43
− Γ2
Γ43
(zs − αs)s−1 − Γ3
Γ43
]
×[
E
(
(wv)2 (zs − v)s−1+
)− Γ3Γ4]

(42)
where Γ1 = E
[
m−1
m∑
i=1
wui (z
s − ui)s−1+
]
, Γ2 = µwu , Γ3 = E
[
n−1
n∑
j=1
wvj (z
s − vj)s−1+
]
,
and Γ4 = µwv .
We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 1
For s = 1, assume that there exists α1 such that the conditionsUDV1 on page 13 are satisfied
and that M
N
P 0F (α
1)− P 0G(α1) 6= 0. Then,
√
n(αˆ1 − α1) d−→ N(0, V 1), with
V 1 = lim
m, n→∞
var
(√
n(αˆ1 − α1)) = Λ1(
µwu
µwv
P 0F (α
1)− P 0G(α1)
)2
and Λ1 given in (41).
For s ≥ 2, suppose that there exists αs such that conditions UDVs on page 13 are satisfied
and that zs > αs. Then,
√
n(αˆs − αs) d−→ N(0, V s), where
V s = lim
m, n→∞
var
(√
n(αˆs − αs)) = Λs[
(s− 1)
(
1− µwu
µwv
)
(zs − αs)s−2
]2
and Λs given in (42).
Proof: See Appendix.
Let us consider the critical value αs and suppose that conditions VDUs are satisfied. As-
suming continuity of the DGP at αs, we obtain that
M
N
P sF (αs)− P sG(αs) = 0. (43)
A consistent estimator of αs is obtained from
Mˆ
Nˆ
Pˆ sF (αˆs)− Pˆ sG(αˆs) = 0. (44)
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Using the same previous conditions when dealing with the asymptotic distribution of αˆs,
denote
Λs =

r−1
Γ42
[
varwu (αs − u)s−1+
]
+
1
Γ42
var
[
wv (αs − v)s−1+
]
+[
Γ3(αs)
Γ42
− Γ1(αs)
Γ42
]2
σ2wv+
2
[
Γ1(αs)
Γ43
− Γ3(αs)
Γ43
]
×[
E
(
(wv)2 (αs − v)s−1+
)− Γ3(αs)Γ4]

(45)
where Γ1(αs) = E
[
m−1
m∑
i=1
wui (αs − ui)s−1+
]
, Γ2 = µwu , Γ3(αs) = E
[
n−1
n∑
j=1
wvj (αs − vj)s−1+
]
,
and Γ4 = µwv . The following theorem gives the asymptotic distribution of αˆs.
Theorem 2
Suppose that conditions VDUs on page 13 are satisfied and that for s ≥ 1 there exists αs
such that M
N
P sF (αs) = P
s
G(αs) and MN P
s
F (z) > P
s
G(z) for all z < αs. Denote ϕ (z) =
M
N
P sF (z) − P sG(z) and note that ϕ (z) > 0 for all z < αs and ϕ (αs) = 0. Then, ϕ′ (αs) =
(s− 1) (M
N
P s−1F (αs)− P s−1G (αs)
) 6= 0. We have that √n(αˆs − αs) d−→ N(0, Vs) where for
s = 1,
V1 = lim
m, n→∞
var
(√
n(αˆ1 − α1)
)
=
Λ1(
µwu
µwv
P 0F (α1)− P 0G(α1)
)2
and for s ≥ 2,
Vs = lim
m, n→∞
var
(√
n(αˆs − αs)
)
=
Λs
(s− 1)2
(
µwu
µwv
P s−1F (αs)− P s−1G (αs)
)2
with Λs given in (45).
Proof: See Appendix.
4 Simulations of the effect of population size on social eval-
uation
We now briefly illustrate the impact of population sizes on welfare rankings using the
CLGU dominance approach. To do this, we consider two populations of different sizes. The
smaller population is of size M and has a distribution F and the larger one is of size N and
has a distribution G. We define those distributions over the [0, 1] interval.
Let population v have a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and population u be piecewise-
linear distributed, that is to say, be uniform over 20 equal segments belonging to the [0, 1]
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interval. The upper limits of these segments are 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40,
0.45, 0.50, 0.55, 0.60, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 0 .95, and 1.00. Because v has a
uniform distribution, these upper limits also correspond to the cumulative probabilities for v
at these points. For the first case that we consider, the cumulative probabilities for u at the
upper limit of each segment are respectively 0.15, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40, 0.45, 0.50, 0.55,
0.60, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.82, 0.85, 0.87, 0.90, 0.95, 0.97 and 1.00. We suppose that
M
N
= 2/3.
v dominates u for low values of α. Figures 4 and 5, also show that α1 =0.3 and α2 =
0.6. The larger population v thus dominates the smaller population u at first order for any
critical level at most equal to 0.3. Second-order dominance is obtained with any α ≤ 0.6.
The second case we consider lets the smaller population u dominate the larger population
v. For this, the cumulative probabilities for u are set to 0.005, 0.01, 0.015, 0.02, 0.025, 0.03,
0.035, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.45, 0.55, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80 and 1.00. We can
then find the critical levels αs. Figures 6 and 7 show that α1 = 0.4 and α2 = 0.2. Hence, the
smaller population u dominates the larger one, at first order, for any critical level α ≥ 0.4,
and at second-order for any α ≥ 0.2.
Table 1 and Table 2 show how the lower and upper bounds for the ranges of normatively
robust critical levels vary with the order of dominance s. αs (the upper bound) is increasing
with s and αs (the lower bound) is decreasing with s. In both cases, this says the ranges of
normatively robust critical levels increase with the order of dominance.
Tables 1 and 2 also show how those bounds are affected by population size. As the ratio
of the population sizes approaches 1 (the two distributions are left unchanged), the value
of αs increases whereas the value of αs decreases. Conversely, if the ratio of the sizes is
sufficiently small, αs becomes small and that of αs becomes large. The intuition is that the
larger the difference in population sizes, the greater the importance of the critical level in
ranking the distributions. Ceteris paribus, therefore, the larger the difference in population
sizes, the more restricted are the ranges of critical levels over which it is possible to rank
distributions.
5 Illustration using Canadian data
We now illustrate the use of the normative and statistical framework developed earlier.
The data are drawn from the Canadian Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1976 and
1986 and the Canadian Surveys of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) for 1996 and 2006.
Empirical studies on poverty and welfare in Canada have mostly used these same data: see
inter alia Chen and Duclos (2008), Chen (2008) and Bibi and Duclos (2009). We use equiv-
alized net income as a measure of individual well-being. We rely for that purpose on the
equivalence scale often employed by Statistics Canada. This equivalence scale applies a fac-
tor of 1 for the oldest person in the family, 0.4 for all other members aged at least 16 and 0.3
for the remaining members under age 16. In order to take into account the differences in spa-
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tial prices, we adjust incomes by the ratio of spatial “market basket measures” (see Human
Resources and Social Development Canada 2006). We also use Statistics Canada’s consumer
price indices to convert dollars into 2002 constant dollars.
The sample sizes from 1976, 1986, 1996 and from 2006 are respectively 28,613, 36,389,
31,973 and 28,524. The use of the sampling weights leads to estimates of Canada’s pop-
ulation size in 1976 of 22,230,000, of 25,384,000 for 1986, of 28,870,000 for 1996, and
of 31,853,000 for 2006. We assign the value of 0 to all negative incomes — this concerns
1.9% of the observations for 1976 and less than 0.5% for the other years. The cumulative
distribution for all four years is shown in Figure 8.
We now turn to testing dominance. The FGT dominance tests set the upper bound of the
censoring point z+ to $70,500, with the implicit assumption that the range [$9,500, $70,500]
will cover any censoring point that one would want to apply. The value of z− = $9,500 is the
minimum equivalent income that allows inferring dominance for most of the comparisons we
will consider below. No more than 7.1% of the observations in any of the four distributions
have equivalent incomes in excess of z+ = $70,500. Setting such a relatively high value for
z+ is also useful to be able to interpret the FGT dominance rankings (almost) as welfare ones.
Table 3 presents the results of the dominance tests based on the range of censoring points
[z−, z+] = [$9,500, $70,500] and the range of critical levels [α−, α+] = [$5,000, $15,000].
The lower limit α− of the critical levels is set arbitrarily to $5,000; the upper limit α+ is close
to Statistics Canada’s Low-Income Cutoff, a popular poverty threshold in Canada.
In Table 3, we test the null hypothesis that the larger population does not dominate the
smaller one. For expositional brevity, we focus on the first-order results. At a 5% significance
level, recent years dominate earlier years for both asymptotic and bootstrap tests, except when
comparing 1986 and 1996. The relatively large lower bound of z− = $9,500 is needed to infer
the dominance of 2006 over 1986 and over 1996; for the other dominance relations, however,
z− can be set lower, such as $3,500 for the dominance of 1986 over 1976 and $4,500 for
the dominance of 1996 over 1976. Notice that all of the dominance relations of larger over
smaller years remains unchanged when the lower bound α− of the critical level becomes
arbitrary close to 0 — see Duclos and Zabsonré (2009).
We now turn to the estimation of the upper bounds αs of the ranges of those critical levels
over which welfare dominance rankings can be made. For this procedure to be valid for dom-
inance of a large over a smaller population, we need to have verified the hypothesis VDUs
for given s. Given the inference results of Table 3, we therefore focus on five dominance
relationships: 1976 versus 1986, 1976 versus 1996, 1976 versus 2006, 1986 versus 1996 and
1996 versus 2006.
Table 4 shows the estimates αˆs for the dominance of 1986 and 1996 over 1976. Analogous
estimates are given in Table 5 for the dominance of 2006 over 1976 and 1996 respectively.
Table 4 shows for instance that 1986 dominates 1976 for all critical levels up to an upper
bound of $30,550, with a standard error of $1,639. As can be seen, the estimates of αs indi-
cate that the dominance of 2006 over 1996 is stronger than the dominance of 2006 over 1976
and the dominance of 1986 over 1976. For instance, the use of any critical level lower than
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$49,592 leads to the dominance of 2006 over 1996 at first-order. However, the dominance of
1996 over 1976 is obtained only for critical levels at most equal to $17,453 (with a standard
error of $1,129). This also indicates that for values of αs greater than $17,453 and for some
of the CLGU welfare indices that are members of the first-order class F1z−,z+ (see (5)), 1996
would not show more welfare than 1976.
We can also estimate the lower bounds αs of critical levels over which smaller populations
dominate larger ones. This is possible to do with our Canadian data only for the dominance
of 1986 over 1996 and when s ≥ 2. The case of s = 1 is indeed too demanding since αˆ1 does
not exist; there are therefore first-order indices that would rank 1996 better and this, for any
choice of critical level value. Considering αs for the dominance of other smaller populations
over larger ones is not possible because the UDVs assumption posited in Section 3 is not
satisfied for such relations. This is partly due to the fact that there are more individuals with
equivalent income equal to 0 in the samples of earlier years than in the samples of more recent
years. Consequently, the estimates of the absolute number of lower-income people in 1976
and 1996 exceeds those of 2006 and it becomes difficult to obtain dominance of 1976 and
1996 over 2006; the same applies for 1986 over 2006.
Figure 9 shows a plot of the estimated absolute number of people below z (“number of
poor”) in 1976 and 1996. As can be seen, if the censoring point z is no more than the critical
level αˆ1, then there are more poor in 1976 than in 1996. For z equal to αˆ1, the number of
poor is estimated to be the same at 8.38 millions for the two years.
Table 6 shows the estimates of αs (for s ≥ 2) for dominance of 1986 over 1996. The
critical level α1 cannot be found, given the initial non-dominance of 1986 over 1996 at first-
order. The estimate of α2 is $23,878, with a standard error of around $1,100. From the results
of Table 6 we can therefore infer that social welfare in Canada has decreased robustly between
1986 and 1996 if lives need to enjoy a level of well-being of at least $25,100 ($23,878 plus
two standard errors) to contribute positively to social welfare, as measured by second-order
welfare indices. With these critical levels, Canada’s smaller population in 1986 exhibits
greater social welfare than Canada’s larger population in 1996 for all of the social welfare
indices that belong to W 2α,z−,z+. If we restrict attention to the class of third-order indices,
W 3α,z−,z+ , then Table 6 says that 1986 has greater social welfare than 1996 if the critical
levels are higher than $21,592 ($19,592 plus twice the standard error of $1,000). For s = 4,
the corresponding figure is around $19,539.
We can also bound the ranges of censoring points over which there is robust dominance
of one year over another. For all critical level values no less than $31,000 and for all second-
order welfare indices, Canada in 1986 is better than in 1996 for all censoring points up to
$53,096. This upper bound of the censoring points increases as the order of dominance s
increases; it reaches a value of $218,360 for s = 4. (The influence of s on αs, αs, and
z+s is established in Duclos and Zabsonré (2009).) The link between the critical level α
and the upper bound of the censoring points z+ is also considered in Figure 10 for first-
order dominance of 1986 over 1976. As the value of z+ increases, the critical level α1
weakly decreases — an analogous relationship holds true for higher orders of dominance and
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for dominance of smaller over larger populations. Thus, the greater the ranges of possible
censoring points we wish to allow for, the lower the ranges of critical levels over which
we can find dominance. (This result is also theoretically discussed in Duclos and Zabsonré
(2009).)
Note that given the definition of VDUs on page 13, any value of the critical level greater
than z+ does not affect the relation of dominance of a larger over a smaller population. That is
to say, if αs = z+, the larger population still dominates the smaller one even if α is arbitrarily
larger than z+ — setting αs is then harmless. Take for instance the case of the first-order
dominance of 1986 over 1976, for which αˆ1 = $30,550. For z+ < $30,550, αˆ1 can thus be
set to as high a level as needed; for z+ ≥ $30,550, we have αˆ1 = $30,550.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops and applies methods for assessing society’s welfare in contexts in
which both population sizes and the distributions of individual welfare can differ. This is-
sue has important implications for monitoring human development and for thinking about
public policy. The paper makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it is one
of the first to use the critical-level generalized utilitarianism (CLGU) framework of Black-
orby and Donaldson (1984), a framework that avoids some of the fundamental weaknesses
of the more traditional total and average utilitarian frameworks. Second, it introduces and
uses relationships that can order distributions over classes of CLGU social welfare functions,
in the tradition of the stochastic dominance approach. Third, it is the first paper to analyze
combined population-sizes and population-distributions rankings in a coherent statistical and
inferential framework. This is done inter alia by developing tools for testing for CLGU
dominance and for estimating the bounds of critical levels and welfare censoring points over
which robust CLGU rankings can be made.
The paper is also the first to apply the CLGU framework to real data. This is done using
Canadian Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF) for 1976 and 1986, and Canadian Surveys
of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) for 1996 and 2006. Asymptotic and bootstrap
procedures are used to test for dominance relationships across these years, relationships that
involve testing over classes of social welfare functions, ranges of censoring points as well as
ranges of critical level values. It is found that recent years generally dominate earlier ones,
suggesting that there has been a social welfare improvement in Canada in spite of the fact that
population size has increased substantially and that new lives do not always increase society’s
welfare in a CLGU framework.
More surprisingly perhaps, Canada’s smaller population in 1986 is socially better than
Canada’s larger population in 1996 in a CLGU framework for a relatively wide range of
critical levels. Yet, comparisons of total and average income indicate the contrary. Total
income in Canada indeed amounts to $654 billion and $789 billion respectively for 1986
and 1996; Canada’s average income is respectively $25,789 and $27,334 for 1986 and 1996.
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Hence, not only can the evaluating frameworks of average and total utilitarianism diverge in
theory and in practice, but they can also give opposite social evaluation rankings to those of
critical-level utilitarianism, an alternative social evaluation framework that has been shown
to resolve nicely some of the ethical lacuna of average and total utilitarianism. This is an
important lesson for anyone interested in the evaluation of policy and human development in
the presence of demographic changes.
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Figure 1: Poverty incidence curves with α = 0 adjusted for differences in population sizes
22
6-
z+α0
M
N
1− M
N
M
N
F (z)
G(z)
F (z)
G(z)
zα10
 
 	
Fα1(z)
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Figure 3: Poverty incidence curves with α = α1 adjusted for differences in population sizes
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Figure 6: Population poverty incidence curves and dominance of the smaller population
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Figure 7: Population P 2 curves and dominance of the smaller population
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Figure 8: Canadian cumulative distributions
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Figure 9: Cumulative distributions of 1976 and 1996 and the critical level
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Figure 10: Relation between z+ and α1
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Table 1: Population sizes and upper bounds of the critical level — large dominates small
α M
N
= 1
4
M
N
= 1
2
M
N
= 2
3
M
N
= 3
4
α1 0.05 0.2 0.3 0.5
α2 0.05 0.3 0.6 0.85
Table 2: Population sizes and lower bounds of the critical level — small dominates large
α M
N
= 1
4
M
N
= 1
2
M
N
= 2
3
M
N
= 3
4
α1 0.95 0.85 0.4 0.3
α2 0.5 0.35 0.2 0.15
Table 3: First-order dominance tests
Dominance Asymptotic p-value Bootstrap p-value
tests LR t LR t
1986 dominates 1976 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1996 dominates 1976 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.000
2006 dominates 1976 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1996 dominates 1986 0.500 0.500 - -
2006 dominates 1986 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000
2006 dominates 1996 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000
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Table 4: Estimates of the upper bound of range of critical levels over which the larger popu-
lation dominates the smaller one
1986 dominates 1976 1996 dominates 1976
s αˆs σˆs αˆs σˆs
s = 1 30,550 1,639 17,453 1,129
s = 2 48,294 2,153 30,708 2,104
s = 3 69,958 3,854 41,263 2,653
s = 4 92,847 5,678 52,203 3,464
Note: All amounts are in 2002 constant dollars; z+ = $100,000.
Table 5: Estimates of the upper bound of the range of critical levels over which the larger
population dominates the smaller one
2006 dominates 1976 2006 dominates 1996
s αˆs σˆs αˆs σˆs
s = 1 33,103 536 49,592 1,674
s = 2 49,628 1,382 90,278 8,772
s = 3 68,704 2,289 140,544 16,691
s = 4 88,770 3,464 192,319 24,773
Note: All amounts are in 2002 constant dollars; z+ = $100,000 (for 1976) and z+ = $200,000 (for 1996).
Table 6: Estimates of lower bound of the critical level
1986 dominates 1996
s αˆs σˆs
s = 1 - -
s = 2 23,878 1,098
s = 3 19,592 1,003
s = 4 17,609 965
Note: All amounts are in 2002 constant dollars; z+ = $30,000.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Graphical illustrations of higher orders of dominance
6
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Figure 11: P s curves and dominance of the larger population
Figures 11, 12 and 13 display FGT curves (adjusted for differences in population sizes) for
a given order of dominance s ≥ 2. In Figure 11, the larger population (with cumulative
distribution G) dominates the smaller one with cumulative distribution F . The three curves
M
N
P sF (z), P
s
G(z) and P sFαs (z) cross at the same point since we assume that VDUs is satisfied
and because P sFαs (z) coincides with
M
N
P sF (z) when αs = z.
In Figures 12 and 13, we show two cases for the dominance of the smaller population over
the larger one. In the first case, a censoring point zs is introduced. As defined in Section 3,
zs is the censoring income value at which P sFαs and P
s
G intersect. Figure 12 is a more general
case; Figure 13 occurs when zs is equal to z+.
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Figure 12: P s curves and dominance of the smaller population (case 1)
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Figure 13: P s curves and dominance of the smaller population (case 2)
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8.2 Proof of Theorems (1) and (2)
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3 in Davidson and Duclos (2000) (henceforth
DD) on page 1460. Let ψ (z) = M
N
P 1F (z) +
(N−M)
N
I (α1 ≤ z) − P 1G (z) and then ψ (α1) =
M
N
P 1F (α
1)+ (N−M)
N
−P 1G (α1). An estimator ofψ (z) is ψˆ (z) = MˆNˆ Pˆ 1F (z)+
(Nˆ−Mˆ)
Nˆ
I (α1 ≤ z)−
Pˆ 1G (z). We have that Mˆ = 1m
∑m
i=1w
u
i and Nˆ = 1n
∑n
j=1w
v
j where (wui )
m
i=1 ∼ iid
(
µwu, σ
2
wu
)
and
(
wvj
)n
j=1
∼ iid (µwv , σ2
wv
)
, because (w˜ui )
m
i=1 and
(
w˜vj
)n
j=1
are assumed to be iid.
According to (37), ψ (α1) ≡ 0. So, using a Taylor expansion for ψ (αˆ1), there exists α˜1
such that |α˜1 − α1| < |αˆ1 − α1| and
ψ
(
αˆ1
) ≈ (αˆ1 − α1)ψ′ (α˜1) .
For m and n → ∞ such that r = m
n
remains constant, we have that αˆ1 → α1 and α˜1 →
α1. Then, for large samples, ψ′ (α˜1) 6= 0 because ψ′ (α1) 6= 0 by assumption, and then
(αˆ1 − α1) ≈ ψ(αˆ
1)
ψ′(α˜1)
. We can use the following result as in DD:
ψˆ
(
α1
)
+ ψ
(
αˆ1
)
= o
(
n−1/2
)
. (46)
Therefore, (
αˆ1 − α1) ≈ − ψˆ (α1)
ψ′ (α˜1)
. (47)
As defined above, we have
ψˆ
(
α1
)
=
Mˆ
Nˆ
Pˆ 1F
(
α1
)
+
(
1− Mˆ
Nˆ
)
− Pˆ 1G
(
α1
) (48)
=
m−1
∑m
i=1w
u
i (α
1 − ui)0+
n−1
∑n
j=1w
v
j
+
(
1− m
−1
∑m
i=1w
u
i
n−1
∑n
j=1w
v
j
)
(49)
−n
−1
∑n
i=j w
v
j (α
1 − vj)0+
n−1
∑n
j=1w
v
j
.
Let
Γˆ(α1) =

m−1
∑m
i=1w
u
i (α
1 − ui)0+
m−1
∑m
i=1w
u
i
n−1
∑n
i=j w
v
j (α
1 − vj)0+
n−1
∑n
j=1w
v
j
 (50)
with Γ(α1) = E
[
Γˆ(α1)
]
. Note that all of the elements of Γˆ(α1) are sums of iid observations.
Let Γi(α1) be the ith element of Γ(α1). We can then write
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ψ
(
α1
)
=
Γ1(α
1)
Γ4(α1)
+
(
1− Γ2(α
1)
Γ4(α1)
)
− Γ3(α
1)
Γ4(α1)
.
Because Γ2(α1) = E
[
m−1
m∑
i=1
wui
]
= µwu ≡ Γ2 and Γ4(α1) = E
[
n−1
n∑
j=1
wvj
]
= µwv ≡
Γ4, we can rewrite ψ (α1) as
ψ
(
α1
)
=
Γ1(α
1)
Γ4
+
(
1− Γ2
Γ4
)
− Γ3(α
1)
Γ4
, (51)
and similarly for ψˆ (α1) by replacing Γ by Γˆ in (51). Let the gradient of ψ (α1) with respect
to Γ(α1) be given by the 4× 1 vector H:
H(α1) =

Γ−14
−Γ−14
−Γ−14
−Γ1(α1)
Γ42
+ Γ2
Γ42
+ Γ3(α
1)
Γ42
 . (52)
Then, using a usual Taylor’s approximation, we have
ψˆ
(
α1
)− ψ (α1) = H(α1)′ [Γˆ(α1)− Γ(α1)] +O (n−1/2) (53)
where H ′ is the transpose of H . Therefore,
Avar
(√
nψˆ
(
α1
))
= nH(α1)′ var
(
Γˆ(α1)
)
H(α1). (54)
We can now give the expression of var
(
Γˆ(α1)
)
, which, for simplicity, we sometimes write
var
(
Γˆ
)
:
var
(
Γˆ
)
=

var
(
Γˆ1
)
cov
(
Γˆ1, Γˆ2
)
0 0
cov
(
Γˆ2, Γˆ1
)
var
(
Γˆ2
)
0 0
0 0 var
(
Γˆ3
)
cov
(
Γˆ3, Γˆ4
)
0 0 cov
(
Γˆ4, Γˆ3
)
var
(
Γˆ4
)
 . (55)
The elements of var
(
Γˆ(α1)
)
can be estimated consistently using the sample covariance ma-
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trix of the elements of Γ(α1). Using equations (52), (54) and (55) together gives
Avar
(√
nψˆ
(
α1
))
=

2n
[
Γ1(α1)
Γ43
− Γ2
Γ43
− Γ3(α1)
Γ43
]
cov
(
Γˆ3, Γˆ4
)
+
n
[
Γ3(α1)
Γ42
− Γ1(α1)
Γ42
+ Γ2
Γ42
]2
var
(
Γˆ4
)
+
n
Γ42
[
var
(
Γˆ1
)
+ var
(
Γˆ2
)]
−
2n
Γ42
cov
(
Γˆ1, Γˆ2
)
+
n
Γ42
var
(
Γˆ3
)

. (56)
Note that
cov
(
Γˆ1(α
1), Γˆ2
)
= m−2
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
cov
[
wui
(
α1 − ui
)0
+
, wuj
]
= m−2
m∑
i=1
cov
[
wui
(
α1 − ui
)0
+
, wui
]
+m−2
m∑
i 6=j
cov
[
wui
(
α1 − ui
)0
+
, wuj
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= m−2
m∑
i=1
cov
[
wui
(
α1 − ui
)0
+
, wui
]
= m−1E
[
(wu)2
(
α1 − u)0
+
]
(57)
−m−1Γ1(α1)Γ2
and, in the same manner,
cov
(
Γˆ3(α
1), Γˆ4
)
= n−1E
[
(wv)2
(
α1 − v)0
+
]
− n−1Γ3(α1)Γ4, (58)
var
(
Γˆ1(α
1)
)
= m−1 var
[
wu
(
α1 − u)0
+
]
, (59)
var
(
Γˆ3(α
1)
)
= n−1 var
[
wv
(
α1 − v)0
+
]
, (60)
var
(
Γˆ2
)
= m−1σ2wu , (61)
var
(
Γˆ4
)
= n−1σ2wv . (62)
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Putting (57), (58), (59), (60), (61) and (62) together gives
Avar
(√
nψˆ
(
α1
))
=

1
Γ42
var
[
wv (α1 − v)0+
]
+
r−1
Γ42
[
varwu (α1 − u)0+ + σ2wu
]
+[
Γ3(α1)
Γ42
− Γ1(α1)
Γ42
+ Γ2
Γ42
]2
σ2wv−
2r−1
Γ42
[
E
(
(wu)2 (α1 − u)0+
)
− Γ1(α1)Γ2
]
+
2
[
Γ1(α1)
Γ43
− Γ2
Γ43
− Γ3(α1)
Γ43
]
×
[
E
(
(wv)2 (α1 − v)0+
)
− Γ3(α1)Γ4
]

. (63)
By (53), ψˆ (α1) is a linear combination of sums of iid variables. We can thus apply the Central
Limit Theorem, which gives that
√
nψˆ
(
α1
) d−→ N(0,Avar(√nψˆ (α1)) .
Using (47), the asymptotic variance of αˆ1 is given by
lim
m, n→∞
var
(√
n(αˆ1 − α1)) = limm, n→∞ var
(√
nψˆ (α1)
)
(
µwu
µwv
P 0F (α
1)− P 0G(α1)
)2 . (64)
It remains to show that
ψˆ
(
α1
)
+ ψ
(
αˆ1
)
= o
(
n−1/2
)
.
Through equations (44) and (37), we know that ψˆ (αˆ1) = ψ (α1) = 0. Then rewrite
−
[
ψˆ
(
α1
)
+ ψ
(
αˆ1
)]
= ψˆ
(
αˆ1
)− ψˆ (α1)− [ψ (αˆ1)− ψ (α1)] .
Using Theorem 2 of DD, we have that αˆ1−α1 = O (n−1/2). Simplifying the notation, denote
Ψˆ
(
αˆ1, α1
) ≡ ψˆ (αˆ1)− ψˆ (α1)− [ψ (αˆ1)− ψ (α1)]
= ψˆ
(
α1 +O
(
n−1/2
))− ψˆ (α1)− [ψ (α1 +O (n−1/2))− ψ (α1)] .
Consequently,
p lim Ψˆ
(
αˆ1, α1
)
= p lim
[
ψˆ
(
α1 +O
(
n−1/2
))− ψ (α1 +O (n−1/2))]
−p lim ψˆ (α1)+ ψ (α1)
= p lim ψˆ
(
α1
)− ψ (α1)− p lim ψˆ (α1)+ ψ (α1)
= 0.
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The second equality comes from the fact that, asymptotically, αˆ1 = α1 + O
(
n−1/2
) → α1.
Appling Bienaymé-Chebyshev’s inequality to Ψˆ (αˆ1, α1), we can write that for any ε > 0,
Pr
(√
n
∣∣∣Ψˆ (αˆ1, α1)∣∣∣ > ε) ≤ var
(√
nΨˆ (αˆ1, α1)
)
ε2
. (65)
We can then compute Avar
(√
nΨˆ (αˆ1, α1)
)
:
Avar
(√
nΨˆ
(
αˆ1, α1
))
= Avar
(√
nψˆ
(
α1 +O
(
n−1/2
)))
+Avar
(√
nψˆ
(
α1
)) (66)
−2Acov
(√
nψˆ
(
α1 +O
(
n−1/2
))
,
√
nψˆ
(
α1
))
.
Using the expression ofAvar
(√
n
(
ψˆ (α1)
))
given in (54), note thatAvar
(√
nψˆ
(
α1 +O
(
n−1/2
)))
can be written in a similar way. Thus,
Avar
(√
nΨˆ
(
αˆ1, α1
))
= nH
(
α1 +O
(
n−1/2
))′
var
(
Γˆ(α1 +O
(
n−1/2
)
)
)
×H (α1 +O (n−1/2))
+nH
(
α1
)′
var
(
Γˆ(α1)
)
H
(
α1
)
−2nH (α1 +O (n−1/2))′ cov (Γˆ(α1 +O (n−1/2)), Γˆ(α1))
×H (α1) .
Asymptotically, H
(
α1 +O
(
n−1/2
)) ≈ H (α1) and Γˆ(α1 +O (n−1/2) ≈ Γˆ(α1). Hence,
cov
(
Γˆ(α1 +O
(
n−1/2
)
), Γˆ(α1)
)
≈ var
(
Γˆ(α1)
)
.
We thus have
Avar
(√
nΨˆ
(
αˆ1, α1
))
= 0.
We obtain that
lim
m, n→∞
Pr
(√
n
∣∣∣Ψˆ (αˆ1, α1)∣∣∣ > ε) = 0. (67)
Because Ψˆ (αˆ1, α1) = ψˆ (α1) + ψ (αˆ1), then
ψˆ
(
α1
)
+ ψ
(
αˆ1
)
= o
(
n−1/2
)
.
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Using (47), the asymptotic variance of αˆ1 is given by
lim
m, n→∞
var
(√
n(αˆ1 − α1)) = limm, n→∞ var
(√
nψˆ (α1)
)
(
µwu
µwv
P 0F (α
1)− P 0G(α1)
)2 (68)
where lim
m, n→∞
var
(√
nψˆ (α1)
)
is given in (63).
We use a similar procedure to derive the asymptotic variance of αˆs for s ≥ 2. Recall that,
for s ≥ 2, αs satisfies the following equation
M
N
P sF (z
s) +
N −M
N
(zs − αs)s−1 − P sG(zs) = 0. (69)
Denote φ (αs) = M
N
P sF (z
s) + N−M
N
(zs − αs)s−1 − P sG(zs). Using a Taylor expansion, there
exists α˜s such that |α˜s − αs| < |αˆs − αs| and
φ (αˆs) ≈ (αˆs − αs)φ′ (α˜s)
where φ′ (α˜s) = − (s− 1) N−M
N
(z+− α˜s)s−2 and φ′ (α˜s) 6= 0 by assumption. From (47), we
obtain that
(αˆs − αs) ≈ − φˆ (α
s)
φ′ (α˜s)
.
Notice that φˆ (αs) = Mˆ
Nˆ
Pˆ sF (z
s) + Nˆ−Mˆ
Nˆ
(zs − αs)s−1 − Pˆ sG(zs) and suppose that zs ≤ z+
is known. Applying the previous results and assuming that the moments of order 2 (s− 1)
exist, we find that
Avar
(√
nφˆ (αs)
)
= lim
m, n→∞
var
(√
nφˆ (αs)
)
=

1
Γ42
var
[
wv (zs − v)s−1+
]
+
r−1
Γ42
[
varwu (zs − u)s−1+ + (zs − αs)2s−2 σ2wu
]
+[
Γ3
Γ42
− Γ1
Γ42
+ Γ2
Γ42
(zs − αs)s−1
]2
σ2wv−
2r−1
Γ42
(zs − αs)s−1 [E ((wu)2 (zs − u)s−1+ )− Γ1Γ2]+
2
[
Γ1
Γ43
− Γ2
Γ43
(zs − αs)s−1 − Γ3
Γ43
]
×[
E
(
(wv)2 (zs − v)s−1+
)− Γ3Γ4]

where Γ1 = E
[
m−1
∑m
i=1w
u
i (z
s − ui)s−1+
]
and Γ2 = µwu; Γ3 = E
[
n−1
∑n
j=1w
v
j (z
s − vj)s−1+
]
and Γ4 = µwv .
Therefore, the asymptotic variance of αˆs is given by
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lim
m, n→∞
var
(√
n(αˆs − αs)) = limm, n→∞ var
(√
nφˆ (αs)
)
[
(s− 1)
(
1− µwu
µwv
)
(zs − αs)s−2
]2 .
Similar arguments can be used to establish the asymptotic distribution of αˆs. 
8.3 Asymptotic equivalence of statistics
Proposition 1
Suppose that r = m
n
remains constant as m and n tend to infinity. For s ≥ 1 and for any pair
(z, α) in the interior of [z−, z+]⊗ [α−, α+], such that P sG(z) = P sFα(z), the statistic LR (z, α)
tends to the square of the asymptotic t-statistic where
t2 (z, α) =
(∆P s (z, α))2
Avar
(√
n
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
)) +O (n−1/2) (70)
with ∆P s (z, α) = p lim
m, n→∞
√
n
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
)
= O (1).
Proof
(Based on Davidson (2009)). We know that
Pˆ sFα(z) =
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui (z − ui)s−1+
)/(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)
(71)
+
[
1−
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui
)/(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)]
(z − α)s−1+ (72)
and
Pˆ sG(z) =
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj (z − vj)s−1+
)/(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)
. (73)
Let Γˆ1 = 1m
m∑
i=1
wui (z − ui)s−1+ , Γˆ2 = 1m
m∑
i=1
wui , Γˆ3 =
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj (z − vj)s−1+ and Γˆ4 =
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj . Thus
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z) =
Γˆ3
Γˆ4
− Γˆ1
Γˆ4
−
(
1− Γˆ2
Γˆ4
)
(z − α)s−1+ .
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Also denote Γˆs =
(
Γˆ1, Γˆ2, Γˆ3, Γˆ4
)′
and Γi = E
[
Γˆi
]
for i = 1, ..., 4. We use a Taylor
approximation to compute the variance of
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
)
. Let
Hs =

−Γ−14
(z − α)s−1+ Γ−14
Γ−14
Γ−24
(
Γ1 − (z − α)s−1+ Γ2 − Γ3
)

and
var
(
Γˆs
)
=

var
(
Γˆ1
)
cov
(
Γˆ1, Γˆ2
)
0 0
cov
(
Γˆ2, Γˆ1
)
var
(
Γˆ2
)
0 0
0 0 var
(
Γˆ3
)
cov
(
Γˆ3, Γˆ4
)
0 0 cov
(
Γˆ4, Γˆ3
)
var
(
Γˆ4
)
 .
Therefore,
Avar
(√
n
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
))
= lim
m, n→∞
n (Hs)′ var
(
Γˆs
)
(Hs)
= lim
m, n→∞
{
n
Γ24
[
var
(
Γˆ1
)
− 2 (z − α)s−1+ cov
(
Γˆ1, Γˆ2
)
+
[
(z − α)s−1+
]2
var
(
Γˆ2
)]
+
n
Γ24
var
(
Γˆ3
)
+
n
[
Γ1 − (z − α)s−1+ Γ2 − Γ3
]2
Γ44
var
(
Γˆ4
)
+
2n
[
Γ1 − (z − α)s−1+ Γ2 − Γ3
]
Γ34
cov
(
Γˆ3, Γˆ4
)}
.
But P sG(z) = P sFα(z) =⇒ Γ3Γ4 − Γ1Γ4 −
(
1− Γ2
Γ4
)
(z − α)s−1+ = 0. Then Γ1 − (z − α)s−1+ Γ2 −
Γ3 = − (z − α)s−1+ Γ4. Consequently, Avar
(√
n
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
))
becomes
Avar
(√
n
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
))
= lim
m, n→∞
{
n
Γ24
[
var
(
Γˆ1
)
− 2 (z − α)s−1+ cov
(
Γˆ1, Γˆ2
)
+
[
(z − α)s−1+
]2
var
(
Γˆ2
)]
+
n
Γ24
[
var
(
Γˆ3
)
− 2 (z − α)s−1+ cov
(
Γˆ3, Γˆ4
)
+
[
(z − α)s−1+
]2
var
(
Γˆ4
)]}
.
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Now consider the ELR statistic. Recall that ELR = 2 [ELF − ELF (z, α)]. We have
that
ELF =
m∑
i=1
log
(
1
m
)
+
n∑
j=1
log
(
1
n
)
. (74)
For ease of exposition, denote uiα = (z − ui)s−1+ − (z − α)s−1+ and vjα = (z − vj)s−1+ −
(z − α)s−1+ . Using the results of the empirical probabilities pui and pvj obtained in (27) and
(28) respectively, we have
ELF (z, α) =
m∑
i=1
log
(
1
m− ρ (ν − wui uiα)
)
+
n∑
j=1
log
(
1
n+ ρ
(
ν − wvj vjα
))
=
m∑
i=1
log
(
1
m
)
+
m∑
i=1
log
 1
1− ρ(ν−w
u
i uiα)
m
 (75)
+
n∑
j=1
log
(
1
n
)
+
n∑
j=1
log
 1
1 +
ρ(ν−wvj vjα)
n

.
Hence, as ELR = 2 [ELF − ELF (z, α)], we find that
1
2
ELR =
m∑
i=1
log
(
1− ρ (ν − w
u
i uiα)
m
)
+
n∑
j=1
log
(
1 +
ρ
(
ν − wvj vjα
)
n
)
.
We now look at the Lagrange multipliers. First define Γˆ1α and Γ1α respectively as Γˆ1α =
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα and Γ1α = E
(
Γˆ1α
)
. Suppose that r = m
n
remains constant as m and n tend to
infinity. Because (wui uiα) for i = 1, ..., m remain constant as m tends to infinity, and because
(wui uiα) i = 1, ..., m are iid, Γˆ1α is a root-n consistent estimator of Γ1α. The same applies
for Γˆ2α = 1n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα and Γ2α = E
(
Γˆ2α
)
. Recall that ν is given in (29) by
ν =
n∑
j=1
pvjw
v
j vjα. (76)
Rewrite ν as
ν =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
npvj
) (
wvj vjα
)
. (77)
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Because the terms
(
npvj
)
and
(
wvj vjα
)
for j = 1, ..., n remain constant as n tends to infinity,
and because
(
wvj vjα
)
j = 1, ..., n are iid,
√
n multiplied by the quantity of the right-hand
side of the above equation is of constant variance and hence is of order 1 in probability. Let
ν¯ be the limit in probability of ν as n tends to infinity. It follows that ν = ν¯ +O
(
n−1/2
)
. In
fact and as will be clearer below, ν = Γˆ2α + O
(
n−1/2
)
. We now turn to ρ. Because the first
relation of (29) gives that
m∑
i=1
pui w
u
i uiα =
n∑
j=1
pvjw
v
j vjα, (78)
this allows displaying ρ by solving for ρ in (78). Using a Taylor expansion on the values of
pui and pvj , we obtain that
ρ =
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα
)
−
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα
)
1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2 − ν
m
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα
)
+ 1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2 − ν
n
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα
) . (79)
Because
(
(wui uiα)
2)m
i=1
and
((
wvj vjα
)2)n
j=1
are iid, p lim
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2
]
= E
[
(wuuα)
2]
and p lim
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2]
= E
[
(wvvα)
2]
. Therefore, 1
m
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2
and 1
n
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2
are of order 1 in probability. See for example Green (2003). This gives that ρ is O (n1/2).
Using this, we can show that ν = Γˆ2α +O
(
n−1/2
)
. Indeed, rewrite ν as
ν =
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα
n + ρ
(
ν − wvj vjα
) .
Then,
ν − 1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα = −
ρ
n
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα
(
ν − wvj vjα
)
1 + ρ
n
(
ν − wvj vjα
) ]
= −ρ
n
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
npvjw
v
j vjα
(
ν − wvj vjα
)]
.
But p lim
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
npvjw
v
j vjα
(
ν − wvj vjα
)]
= ν¯2 − p lim
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
npvj
(
wvj vjα
)2]
. The second
term is of order 1 in probability, because it is defined as a weighted average of iid variables.
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Hence, ρ
n
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
npvjw
v
j vjα
(
ν − wvj vjα
)]
is O
(
n−1/2
)
and ν − 1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα = O
(
n−1/2
)
.
Similarly, the relation (78) allows us writing that ν − 1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα = O
(
n−1/2
)
. Using such
relations, we can write that ν = 1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα+O
(
n−1/2
)
and ν = 1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα+O
(
n−1/2
)
.
Consequently, ρ becomes
ρ =
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα − 1n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα
1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2 − ν2
m
+ 1
n
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2 − ν2
n
. (80)
Using again a Taylor expansion applied on the log function, we obtain that
m∑
i=1
log
(
1− ρ (ν − w
u
i uiα)
m
)
=
m∑
i=1
(
−ρ (ν − w
u
i uiα)
m
− ρ
2 (ν − wui uiα)2
2m2
)
+O
(
n−1/2
)
= −ρν + ρ 1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα −
ρ2ν2
2m
− ρ
2
2m2
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2
+
ρ2ν
m2
m∑
i=1
wui uiα +O
(
n−1/2
)
and
n∑
j=1
log
(
1 +
ρ
(
ν − wvj vjα
)
n
)
=
n∑
j=1
(
ρ
(
ν − wvj vjα
)
n
− ρ
2
(
ν − wvj vjα
)2
2n2
)
+O
(
n−1/2
)
= ρν − ρ 1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα −
ρ2ν2
2n
− ρ
2
2n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2
+
ρ2ν
n2
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα +O
(
n−1/2
)
.
Then the expression of ELR becomes
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12
ELR = ρ
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα −
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα
)
+
ρ2
2
[
2ν
m
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα
)
− ν
2
m
− 1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2
]
+
ρ2
2
[
2ν
n
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα
)
− ν
2
n
− 1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2]
+O
(
n−1/2
)
.
Using the fact that ν = 1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα + O
(
n−1/2
)
and ν = 1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα + O
(
n−1/2
)
, this
expression is equivalent to
1
2
ELR = ρ
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα −
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα
)
(81)
−ρ
2
2
[
1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2 − ν
2
m
+
1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2 − ν2
n
]
+O
(
n−1/2
)
.
Using (80), the ELR is simply given by
ELR =
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα − 1n
n∑
j=1
wvj vjα
)2
[
1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2 − ν2
m
+ 1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2 − ν2
n
] +O (n−1/2) .
Hence, dividing the numerator and the denominator by
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)2
allows writing ELR as
ELR =
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
)2
[
1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2 − 1
m
ν2 + 1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2 − 1
n
ν2
]/(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)2 +O (n−1/2) .
(82)
This last expression is equivalent to
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ELR =
n
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
)2
n
[
1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2 − 1
m
ν2 + 1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2 − 1
n
ν2
]/(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)2 +O (n−1/2) .
(83)
Denote ui = (z − ui)s−1+ , uα = (z − α)s−1+ and vj = (z − vj)s−1+ . Then
1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2 − 1
m
ν2 =
1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui uiα)
2 − 1
m
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui uiα
)2
+O
(
n−1/2
)
=
1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui ui)
2 − 1
m
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui ui
)2
−2uα
(
1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui )
2
ui − 1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui ui)
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui
)
+u2α
 1
m2
m∑
i=1
(wui )
2 − 1
m
(
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui
)2+O (n−1/2) .
The same thing applies for
(
1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2 − 1
n
ν2
)
and we obtain that
1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vjα
)2 − 1
n
ν2 =
1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vj
)2 − 1
n
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vj
)2
−2uα
(
1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj
)2
vj − 1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj vj
) 1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)
+u2α
 1
n2
n∑
j=1
(
wvj
)2 − 1
n
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)2+O (n−1/2) .
Therefore the dominator of ELR is simply the following expression:
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n(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)2
(
v̂ar
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
(wui ui)
]
− 2uαĉov
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
(wui ui) ,
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui
]
+ u2αv̂ar
[
1
m
m∑
i=1
wui
])
+
n(
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
)2
(
v̂ar
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vj
]
− 2uαĉov
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj vj,
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
]
+ u2αv̂ar
[
1
n
n∑
j=1
wvj
])
+O
(
n−1/2
)
.
Using the notation on pages 38 and 44, this expression can be rewritten as
n
Γ24
[
v̂ar
(
Γˆ1
)
− 2 (z − α)s−1+ ĉov
(
Γˆ1, Γˆ2
)
+
[
(z − α)s−1+
]2
v̂ar
(
Γˆ2
)]
+
n
Γ24
[
v̂ar
(
Γˆ3
)
− 2 (z − α)s−1+ ĉov
(
Γˆ3, Γˆ4
)
+
[
(z − α)s−1+
]2
v̂ar
(
Γˆ4
)]
+O
(
n−1/2
)
.
Notice that the above expression is exactly the estimator of the variance of n1/2
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
)
when using the condition thatP sG(z) = P sFα(z). Hence, as we can see,ELR coincides asymp-
totically with t2 (z, α) given that ∆P s (z, α) = p lim
m, n→∞
√
n
(
Pˆ sG(z)− Pˆ sFα(z)
)
= O (1). 
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